Hey folks, did anyone catch the Benfica vs. Milan game? I was expecting a tighter contest, but those two early goals from Benfica really put Milan on the back foot. The defensive lapses and maybe a bit of over‑confidence from the Italians? 🤔
What do you think was the biggest factor in Milan's loss? Was it a tactical misread from Pioli, or did Benfica just execute their game plan perfectly? Would love to hear your takes!
Benfica's 2-0 Shock on Milan – What Went Wrong for the Rossoneri?
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Pioli went in with essentially a 4‑2‑3‑1, keeping a low block and trying to sit deep to absorb Benfica’s press. The problem was that the double pivot—Kessie and Tonali—were forced to cover a lot of ground, and they never got the support to close down the Lisbon side’s front three. Benfica’s wingers, especially Gonçalo Ramos, exploited the half‑spaces with quick diagonal runs, and Milan’s full‑backs were caught out of position trying to provide width. The result was a lot of space between the back four and the midfield, which Benfica sliced with their 4‑2‑3‑1, pressing high on the ball and forcing Milan into 50‑plus passes under pressure.
Statistically, Milan only managed 4 shots on target compared to Benfica’s 9, and their xG was a paltry 0.38 versus 1.71 for the Portuguese side. The pressing numbers say it all: Benfica completed 22 successful pressures in the final third per 90, while Milan’s pressure success rate was under 10 %. In the first 15 minutes, Benfica’s coordinated press forced two sloppy back‑passes that Ramos turned into the opening goal, and the second came from a similar scenario—Milan’s centre‑backs were playing the ball too high, and the Portuguese striker slipped in behind to finish cleanly.
So, it wasn’t just over‑confidence; it was a tactical mismatch. Pioli’s reluctance to adjust the line, coupled with a lack of a disciplined midfield press, handed Benfica the freedom to dominate the middle third and create those early chances. A more compact 4‑4‑2 or pulling the midfielders deeper to block the channels could have at least limited the space Benfica exploited. As it stood, the Rossoneri were simply out‑pressed and out‑positioned from the kickoff.
Benfica’s early double was less about a single mistake and more about a systemic collapse in Milan’s defensive shape. Pioli left a high line with an exposed space between the full‑backs and the centre‑backs, and Benfica’s quick wingers exploited that gap with diagonal runs that forced Milan to shift laterally, opening up the channels for the second‑round finish. The Italian side also seemed to abandon their usual compact midfield press, giving the Portuguese side time on the ball to orchestrate the overload on the flanks.
On the other hand, Milan’s own over‑confidence showed up in the lack of immediate reaction after the first goal. Instead of pressing high to disrupt Benfica’s build‑up, the Rossoneri fell back into a deeper block, effectively ceding possession and tempo. That gave Benfica the freedom to settle, reorganise and hit Milan with a second, more clinical strike. Pioli’s tactical tweak—dropping the midfield line—ended up playing right into Benfica’s game plan of quick transitions.
But what about the role of Milan’s midfield transition after the opening goal? Did the failure to press the ball high and win it back in the middle third cripple their ability to reset defensively, or was it more about the individual lapses of the centre‑backs that left those dangerous spaces open?